
■ DEVELOPMENT AID

Trimmed budget: Minister 'was not firm enough'



Both the Bonn government and the Minister for Economic Cooperation have come under fire from a Bundestag committee.

The economic cooperation committee, comprising members from all four parties, says that Bonn is too weak in its administration of development policy.

One member of the committee said that if the Minister, Rainer Offergeld, had taken a tougher line, the aid budget would not have been trimmed so much.

This year, DM6.03bn will be spent, 3.2 per cent more than last year.

But in 1979 the Cabinet decided to allow the economic cooperation budget to increase twice as fast as the allocations to other ministries.

In successive bids to cut costs this was watered down to "above-average growth".

But this year's 3.2 per cent is below the overall increase of 4 per cent.

A CDU member of the economic cooperation committee, Winfried Pinger, feels that the Minister did not take a hard enough stand.

The Bundestag finance committee would never have dared to economise so stringently if it had faced stiffer resistance, he said.

The committee also criticises the government's development aid report.

The next report — they are published every second year — must contain greater detail about policy towards the main recipients of aid.

The committee wants the Minister to be more aggressive.

In unprecedented unanimity MPs from all four parties have drawn up a 14-point programme for discussion by the Bundestag.

Their aim is to demonstrate to the Bundestag as a whole the importance of development policy and to give Herr Offergeld more backing.

Pinger, a Christian Democratic member for Cologne, feels it is particularly important when times are hard for aid experts from all parties to close ranks.

The aims proclaimed by the government can be used to justify virtually any project, Herr Pinger says. What he would like to see is a list of priorities.

This is one recommendation the committee is especially keen to impress upon the Minister.

Aid to the Third World must first and foremost serve the cause of promoting human rights, with aid being granted less to specific states than to the poorest sections of the population in all developing countries.

Bonn must also try to ensure that people in the countries concerned are included in the process of development.

Arms exports may not be mentioned in the 14-point programme, but Bundestag MPs aim to take a closer and more critical look at the arms trade.

"Countries that go in for a substantial arms build-up must be made to feel the pinch when it is their turn for development aid," says Christian Democrat Heinz Günther Hüsch, committee vice-chairman.

Such considerations have so far played little or no part in the policy pursued by Herr Offergeld's Ministry, which since mid-1980 has been based on an 81-point programme of development policy guidelines.

All bilateral cooperation projects and programmes are, by the terms of these guidelines, to concentrate on combating the absolute poverty in which about 800 million live all over the world.

Further emphasis is on three points:

- Rural development is to be improved to combat famine and the flight from the land.
- Energy projects are to be promoted to reduce developing countries' dependence on imported oil.
- Nature conservation is to be encouraged to prevent soil erosion and the like.

Over half Bonn's aid commitments are to the UN-designated least-developed countries and to others among the poorer members of the Third World. This proportion is to increase.

Greater emphasis is also to be placed on technical cooperation, the heading under which development aides, advisers, experts and instructors are provided.

If these plans are to be carried out, other pledges must be cancelled. Funds are limited. The Ministry's budget is much lower this year than might have been expected from assurances given when times were less hard.

More than 17,000 development aid projects have been undertaken since the mid-50s.

The first, in 1955, took a party of Economic Affairs Ministry experts to Saudi Arabia, where they undertook an on-the-spot fact-finding mission to sound out development prospects.

Projects were not systematically monitored until the early 70s, when an inspection department was established at the Economic Cooperation Ministry, and even it can only review a handful of projects a year at all thoroughly.

In 1980, 32 projects were reviewed. In one case, an engineering project in Pakistan, the aim of promoting small- and medium-scale industry was felt not to be working. So the scheme is to be abandoned.

For years there has been growing scepticism about public financing of industrial projects in the Third World, fuelled mainly by spectacular large-scale projects like the Rourkela steel complex in India.

Work on Rourkela began in 1953, when an Indian government contract was awarded to German companies. After a few years the project ran into financial difficulties and unwittingly grew into the largest single German capital aid project.

Bonn has so far committed more than DM1bn in concessional-rate loans to Rourkela, which is running at a profit and shortly to be modernised and enlarged.

But the development benefits to be derived from such mammoth projects are dubious. Herr Pinger says the money could have been invested in many smaller projects from which more people, a wider range of people, might have stood to benefit.

The Ministry is wondering whether loans towards industrial projects ought not to be restricted. They are certainly felt to require much more comprehensive planning.

The development benefit to be derived from tourist projects has likewise proved negligible. For years the Ministry has stopped awarding grants towards projects of this kind.

Tax preferences on investment in the Third World have been abolished as part of the recent round of budget economies.

This tax provision was intended to promote investment in the developing countries but initially was mainly used by tax write-off companies to build hotels in Spain.

Even after this loophole had been closed the Ministry did not expect the tex preference to work wonders, but it was hoping that benefits would accrue.

No-one, however, is seriously upset that the Developing Countries (... tion) Act has been scrapped.

Ministry officials feel the most ... tive measures are projects related ... sic requirements such as food, clo... housing, health and education.

Success rates increase the further moved operations are from central government and the closer they are ... liable local authorities.

This having been said, few grass... projects of this kind have been ... ched so far. They are heavily depe... on committed field workers, of ... there are too few.

DED, the German Developmen... vice, is the Federal Republic's eq... lent of the peace corps. At pres... has 462 vacancies.

These vacancies are in a wide ... of jobs, including town and co... planners, civil engineers and surve... motor and agricultural mechanics, ... restry officers, agricultural eng... and management graduates with co... rative experience.

DED adviser Heinz-Josef U... says it is growing increasingly diff... to find the right people. This is bec... aid volunteers need to have more ... and life experience than they used ...

Maybe DED will be a benefici... Herr Offergeld does what the com... tee advises and adopts a more agg... ive attitude on develoment aid.

Bundestag ready to act across party lines

The Bundestag seems prepared ... lend him support should he choose ... do so. It should soon be making ... first-ever all-party recommendation ...

This is something it has never do... the past, says Klaus Poser of the Pr... tant Church development aid ser... He was partly responsible for ge... the Bundestag committee to act.

An all-party recommendation ... sed by the Bundestag in full ... would provide an opportunity ... lopment aid policy emerging ... party-political squabbles from ... suffered until only a few years ago.

Wolfgang Ko...

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 4 March ...)

Bonn plans a pensioner peace corps

The Bonn government intends setting up an overseas peace corps of older people.

Similar schemes are run by Britain, France, Japan, Canada, the United States and Switzerland.

In charge of sounding out the possibilities is Gerhard Fritz, 61, who retired at the end of last year as head of the German Foundation for International Development in Brlin.

Dr Fritz says that grey hair is the hallmark of the expert in many countries, especially in China and the Arab world.

Aid organisations have been having difficulty recruiting people with the right qualifications.

Bonn Economic Cooperation Minister Rainer Offergeld says more people are applying for development aid jobs overseas but they aren't always the right people.

Agencies need people with a good track record in their careers and qualifications as, say, engineers, technicians and agricultural graduates.

Management staff and experts in many sectors are required to work as short-term consultants for three or six months analysing projects or helping to get them off the ground.

But people with the professional experience required tend already to have jobs they are reluctant to quit to embark on development aid ventures.

Pensioners no longer need worry about their careers, and their children have long since grown up and set up homes of their own.

Dr Fritz feels sure there must be many people with outstanding qualifications who would be happy to put them to use abroad now they are no longer in demand at home.

He has in mind experts who have no financial worries and can afford to take on an assignment for, say, six months free of charge but with all expenses paid.

Younger staff are virtually impossible to recruit for short-term work of this kind. Their companies are unwilling to give them leave.

Pensioners can help themselves as well as others. They get to see more of the world and help to counteract ... shock of being thrown out of the w... ing world.

They must, of course, be ... adaptable and, if at all possible, ... foreign languages.

The idea is not new. Britain, Fr... Japan, Canada, the United States ... Switzerland already run schemes ... these lines.

Dr Fritz is probing the experie... they have gained and aims by the ... of the year to submit proposals fo... project suited to German requirem... and conditions.

He is considering recruiting not ... pensioners who will be able to co... eract the shock of retirement, but ... working specialists aged about ... whose careers are coming to an end.

These pre-retirement staff w... need to be paid adequate salaries, ... Dr Fritz is sure there is no shortage ... qualified staff on the market.

He is thinking in terms of good ... who have been made redundant ... companies going into liquidation ... are unable to find suitable altern... employment immediately.

Horst Zimmerm...

(Hamburger Abendblatt, 2 March ...)

The German Tribune

Hamburg, 21 March 1982
Twenty-first Year - No. 1029 - By air

A WEEKLY REVIEW OF THE GERMAN PRESS

C 20725 C
ISSN 0016-8858

Genscher reveals plans to repair the bridges



Bonn Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher wants regular meetings between European foreign ministers and the American Secretary of State.

Herr Genscher sees this as one way of intensifying consultations between both sides of the Atlantic.

These meetings would help alliance countries to spell out their respective views early.

The aim is to take the steam out of differences of opinion before they become too dramatic.

Herr Genscher's proposal was made in Washington, where he was trying to shore up relations between the United States and Europe.

He is trying to do something that Henry Kissinger could not. When Kissinger was Secretary of State, few will recall that he proclaimed a Year of Europe.

It was a bid to improve communications between the two sides and bring about a lasting improvement in transatlantic ties. But it didn't work.

Somewhere or other in the wide waves of day-to-day politics the process was swamped.

Now, against a background of serious tension within the Western alliance, a fresh attempt is being made.

It remains to be seen whether Herr Genscher's proposal will come to anything.

There is not a universal enthusiasm about the idea of institutionalising Euro-American consultations in addition to the many existing gatherings and conferences.

So Herr Genscher's proposal will in part have been tactical. By emphasising his desire not to be diverted, despite differences of opinion, from his aim of framing a joint policy with Washington, he will have sought to strengthen Secretary of State Haig's hand in Washington. In Europe Mr Haig is felt to be the one member of the Reagan administration who is prepared not only to criticise but also to consider European views.

There is no shortage of topics on which continual consultations could he held, and not just on matters of detail and day-to-day affairs.

Agreement must be reached on what has caused disagreements.

Closer scrutiny reveals that typical patterns of behaviour on both sides of the Atlantic have been reversed.

It used to be Europe that was cautious to the point of anxiety, sceptical and pessimistic, whereas America in European eyes was often motivated by facile optimism.

Now it is the Europeans, or at least their leading statesmen, who seem more on the optimistic side, especially over prospects for East-West relations.

Washington, in contrast, is guided by a prevailing watchful and critical pessimism in foreign affairs.

Herr Genscher illustrated this during his visit to Washington.

James Reston mentioned in the *New York Times* a conversation the German Foreign Minister had held with journalists in Washington in which Genscher had shown himelf to be an optimist.

Herr Genscher had described the West's problems as negligible in comparison with the Soviet Union's. Moscow had greatly overstretched itself economically and internationally.



Briefing the Chancellor. Bonn Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher on his return from Washington, tells Chancellor Schmidt all about his trip. Herr Genscher had wide ranging talks on matters affecting both Europe and America. (Photo: dpa)

The Kremlin had to fight a war in Afghanistan and to support Vietnam in its war in Cambodia. It had made promises in Africa, and there were economic difficulties all over the Eastern bloc, especially in Poland.

Herr Genscher, or so Mr Reston said, worked on the assumption that the peoples of Eastern Europe were increasingly convinced there were two reasons for their low standard of living: a bad and damaging economic system, and the burden of armaments.

Herr Genscher inferred from this that the political pressure on the Soviet Union to aim for disarmament would keep gotting stronger.

Economic factors and the constant desire for greater self-determination in Eastern Europe would oblige the Soviet Union to consider ideas that were more painful for it than anything the West had to face.

Mr Reston described the general tenor of what Herr Genscher had to say as advice to the United States to take matters a little easier.

Herr Genscher's analysis of the situation does not differ to any great extent from assessments made in Washington; the differences lie in the conclusions.

Washington does not believe in an automatic process by which the Soviet leaders, given the negative factors of which they are naturally as well aware as anyone else, are bound to reach right and reasonable conclusions.

No signs are seen of flexibility among the Soviet leadership, rather the opposite. Soviet leaders are felt not to be able to forestall crises by acting in advance. They only recognise the risks once crises have arisen.

So for this reason, a degree of pessimism, Washington wants to intensify pressure, especially economic pressure, on the Soviet Union.

America feels bound to counter Soviet moves in the same manner all over the world so as to heighten both the problems and the risks faced by the Soviet leaders.

The aim, as it were, is to accelerate the process of learning to be undergone by the Soviet leaders, a process presupposed by Herr Genscher as natural but, of course, long-term.

One might say, to heighten the contrast, that Herr Genscher's outlook is based on a belief in the progress of history in accordance with laws, whereas the US thinks that only deliberate action can make things happen as it wants them to.

Such differences of viewpoint seldom occur in pure and undiluted form in practical politics, but occasionally, as in ties between Europe and the United States at present, it does happen.

Take the much-discussed pipelines-for-natural gas contract with the Soviet Union.

US criticism of the deal is only partly

Continued on page 2

IN THIS ISSUE

Count Lambsdorff in Egypt

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak greets Bonn Economic Affairs Minister Count Otto Lambsdorff in Cairo. The main theme of their talks was commerce. Count Lambsdorff also had talks with Overseas Trade Minister Fuad Haschem. (Photo: dpa)

■ WORLD AFFAIRS

Genscher takes in his stride the role of fair weather maker

Hans-Dietrich Genscher takes in his stride the aches and pains of being the untiring fair weather maker between Bonn and Washington.

The unpleasant side does not distract him from his diplomatic objective of ensuring that fine weather prevails in German-American relations.

A year ago, when the Reagan administration in its halcyon early days first took the Europeans aback with strident talk of an arms build-up, Herr Genscher in Washington concentrated on a joint arms control policy.

Nato now has a concept and a timetable for arms control talks with the Soviet Union, although the prospects of success may be uncertain. Other problems now take priority.

On his latest visit to Washington Herr Genscher could hardly have been in any doubt that martial law in Poland and the obdurate *machtpolitik* pursued by Moscow had alarmingly highlighted the lack of a joint Western strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union.

Differences in analysis and response to developments in the East Bloc by Bonn and Washington have resulted in individual conflicts, such as the clash over the pipelines-for-natural gas contract, imposing a strain on German-American relations.

Views held about each other on either side of the Atlantic are jeopardised by dangerous judgements and prejudice.

US conservatives are responding to peace movements and neutralist noises in Western Europe with growing nationalism and unilateralism.

Herr Genscher mainly visited Wash-



ington to prepare with the US government for two key events, the Western economic summit in Paris and the Nato summit in Bonn, both of which are scheduled for early June.

The West will be as naked as on the day that it was born if the two conferences end inconclusively.

In Paris the economic summit is unlikely to have much difficulty in agreeing yet again to stem the tide of protectionism in any form.

But how are the industrialised countries to cope with mass unemployment, to contain the consequences of US interest rate policies and to assess how President Reagan's deficit budget will fare in Congress?

There are few signs so far of a joint approach taking shape.

In preparing for the Nato summit Herr Genscher is working on two basic assumptions, the first being that the quality of ties between Bonn and Washington will largely determine the tenor of ties between the United States and Western Europe.

Second, if joint Western strategies are to be framed, the political dimension of the North Atlantic pact must be more strongly emphasised.

This idea is by no means undisputed, neither in Germany nor in America. Some members of the Reagan administration are worried that if Nato were saddled with too many political decisions the United States could be tied down.

So Herr Genscher put forward in Washington plans for concerted action. Concerts include solos, but for the score he recommended a kind of conference favoured by the European Community: informal gatherings of Nato Foreign Ministers, without ritual declarations and mountains of paperwork.

Herr Genscher swears by the productivity of a framework of this kind, but even Mr Haig was only moderately interested in the idea.

The US Secretary of State was his main point of contact in Washington. He and Mr Haig agree to an extent he invariably emphasises as a good example of German-American relations.

Continuing differences of opinion with other members of the US administration are played down.

Defence Secretary Weinberger, unlike Mr Haig, did not say the pipelines-for-natural gas contract was no longer a problem as far as he was concerned.

Even so, Herr Genscher feels he has now put behind him the worst part of the hard work of convincing members of the US administration in Washington.

He was surprised, as most of the many German visitors to Washington are, how wildly exaggerated the views are that Congress in particular seems to hold on how dependent Europe stands to be on Soviet energy supplies and how substantial German trade with the East Bloc is.

He left Mr Haig in no doubt as to his reservations about US policy in Central America but claims to be absolutely sure there will be no US military intervention there.


One of the more salient results of the visit to Washington may turn out to have been President Reagan's decision, deadlines allowing, to visit Berlin as well as Bonn.

Nothing but benefit can be derived from Mr Reagan seeing for himself the reality of Germany divided by the borderline between East and West.

The only drawback will be that the route will probably need to be cleared in advance to ensure that protest demonstrations cause no mishaps.

Ulrich Schiller

(Die Zeit, 12 March 1982)



Repairing bridges

Continued from page 1

based on the argument that Bonn would grow too dependent on the Soviet Union as an energy supplier, this being an argument Bonn promptly tries to disprove with figures.

The basic American argument is that the natural gas contract will relieve the pressure on the Soviet Union exerted by economic problems of its own.

The European counter-argument is that the Soviet Union must be allowed to develop its energy resources and, to some extent, to market them.

This at least directed the Soviet leaders' attention to domestic development. If no opportunity of Western assistance were open to the Soviet Union, Moscow would devote itself much more strongly than hitherto to the struggle for power and influence in the commodity-rich countries in general and the petroleum-exporting nations in particular.

That, the argument runs, would heighten the aggressive attitude taken by Moscow and make the international political situation even more explosive.

Washington and Bonn agree on one point at least, that new and critical processes lie ahead in the 80s that will need to be jointly dealt with.

This, as in decades past, is what is at stake on both sides of the Atlantic. Differences of behaviour will be permissible, but only providing they are reciprocally understood.

(Der Tagesspiegel, 14 March 1982)

Time for a spell of East-West reflection

The time has come to pause for thought on East-West talks. An intermission, lengthy but specified, is probably the best way of getting back into business.

At the Helsinki review conference in Madrid the three groups of countries, Nato, the Warsaw Pact and the non-aligned, have agreed to adjourn until November.

Differences of opinion of Poland, Afghanistan and human rights threatened to gamble away once and for all the confidence so painstakingly accumulated.

In Geneva the US and Soviet delegates at the talks on a reduction of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe are taking a two-month break.

The US Congress has refused to ratify Salt 2, signed in 1979, thereby removing a cornerstone of the entire arms control structure.

Governments in East and West must now consider what they actually want and what they are likely to accomplish.

Janez Stanovnik of Yugoslavia, executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Europe, agrees that the two sides have no choice but to set their political sights a little lower.

"East-West ties are like those between a man and a woman who are not in love with each other," he says.

"As long as they stay just good friends, all is fine. But as soon as one comes too close to the other, friendship is over."

The Soviet Union came too close to the West by occupying non-aligned Afghanistan and by backing a peace movement opposed exclusively to Western overarmament.

The United States brought Soviet blood to the boil by no longer exercising the slightest restraint in its sudden passion for Poland.

Mr Stanovnik's comparison can naturally be challenged. No comparison between a communist and a parliamentary form of government can hold water.

Governments in Eastern Europe are not, for the most part, supported by majority opinion in their countries, as has most recently been demonstrated by Poland.

No convinced democrat in the West could possibly condone giving East Bloc rulers *carte blanche* for oppression of the public on grounds of *realpolitik*.

This is where a dilemma faces the Western-orientated Helsinki review conference participants.

The East Bloc has emerged as a major trading partner and a market the West is most reluctant to forfeit in view of sales problems in the free markets.

On the other hand we would be betraying our convictions if we were to accept as a price of our own well-being the slavery of our neighbours.

The internment camps set up in Poland after the imposition of martial law simply had to be raised at the Madrid conference table.

Arguments marshalled by bankers and sales executives no longer count when peaceful development and human dignity are at stake.

Conversely, the countries of Eastern Europe are well aware that they will never be able to close the industrial and economic gap without technological cooperation with the West.

They are as much on the verge of collapse as are many developing countries.

Moscow and Warsaw now have eight months in which to bring about a state of affairs that will enable all-European talks to be resumed.

During this time the West must also come to a conclusion on whether there are alternatives to a policy of detente.

One department of negotiations that ought not to be affected by ideological considerations is arms control. Nuclear devices make no distinction between communists and anti-communists.

The Soviet Union, like past US administrations, has always drawn a dividing line between disarmament negotiations and other political issues.

It was President Reagan who felt obliged to link the arms race with events in Poland. But the US government now seems to be returning to the path of wisdom.

Defence Secretary Weinberger in a speech to the National Press Club in Washington has said that negotiations with Moscow on strategic armaments could begin in the next few months if the Soviet Union were so inclined.

There are growing indications that the United States has proposed a first round of Salt talks to start in June.

That would mean the talks between the superpowers on intercontinental and intermediate-range missiles in Europe, related topics if even there were any, could finally be run parallel to each other.

Pierre Simonitsch

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 10 March 1982)

The German Tribune

Publisher: Friedrich Reinecke. Editor-in-Chief: Otto Heinz. Editor Alexander Anthony. English language sub-editor Simon Burnett. – Distribution Manager Georgine Picone

Friedrich Reinecke Verlag GmbH. 23 Schoene Aussicht, Hamburg 76, Tel.: 22 85 1. Telex: 02-14733

Advertising rates list No 13 – Annual subscription DM 35.

Printed by Druck- und Verlagshaus Friedrich Pörtner, Bremen-Blumenthal. Distributed in the USA by MASS MAILINGS, Inc. 540 West 24th Street, New York, NY 10011

All articles which THE GERMAN TRIBUNE reprints are published in cooperation with the editorial staffs of leading newspapers of the Federal Republic of Germany. They are complete translations of the original text, in no way abridged nor editorially redrafted.

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■ HOME AFFAIRS

Environmentalists top 5 per cent as SPD slides in local elections

The Environmentalists (Greens) captured 5.5 per cent of the total vote and 27 council seats in the Schleswig-Holstein local elections this month. The Christian Democrats topped the poll with 50.1 per cent, a slight rise over last time. The Social Democrats' share of the poll fell by almost 6 per cent to 34.6 per cent and the Free Democrats lost a fraction, to 6.8 per cent. The turnout was down more than 4 per cent.

The decline of the Social Democratic Party continues. The trend has been confirmed by the Schleswig-Holstein local elections, the first of this year's round of elections.

The SPD slide is gathering momentum to the point where it could be stripped of political power in most municipalities, almost all *Länder* and possibly in Bonn.

How far the Schleswig-Holstein elections can be taken as a national indicator is debatable. Even so, the SPD defeat is more than a regional event.

The fact that the Social Democrats lost 6 per cent (one-sixth of their voters) should be grounds enough for depression.

After all, it was always the cities and municipalities in general where the party had its roots. And if these roots wither (like in Lower Saxony and Berlin last year) the Social Democrats will lose some of their lifeblood and their ability to govern.

Of course, the SPD was not helped by the scandal over Neue Heimat, the trade-union-owned building company and the affair over party contributions.

The SPD prospects were further reduced by unemployment and economic uncertainty.

But the SPD in Germany's most northern state cannot excuse its poor performance by pointing to the desolate picture presented by the Bonn coalition.

That SPD chapter in particular has repeatedly demonstrated that it does not identify itself with the Bonn government.

The left-radical course did not pay off — neither with voters concerned with the environment (for otherwise the environmentalists would not have made such gains) nor with those who back the Social-Liberal coalition, many of whom abstained.

How can the SPD check its decline? How can it stop itself from tumbling from one defeat to another this year?

It cannot make the electorate vote for it by creating problems that confuse or upset the voter.

Yet exactly this is happening. The headline-making weekend meetings of the Social Democrats convey the impressions of a party headed back towards its own difficult past.

The impression is that of a party that is not out to fight to overcome acute problems and stay in power but a party seeking a better life in a "state of the future".

The question that comes to mind is whether Eppler, Lafontaine and the other leaders of the opposition within the party are acting out of idealism.

Or are they perhaps not out to get the best possible starting positions for the big cleanup that is bound to come once the party has lost its power in Bonn?

Whatever the motives of the opponents of the Chancellor and his policy, they have a greater effect on the picture presented by the SPD today than the government and the SPD MPs in the Bundestag.

Eppler & Co. reject the double Nato decision on arms and negotiations and head the opposition against the economic and energy policy drafted in a coalition compromise.

They thus provide the electorate with an alternative Social Democratic programme, clearly shouldering co-responsibility for the future of the SPD.

But this alternative SPD is unlikely to meet with much favour. The voters will not reward a disunited party — particularly not when this faction is out to harm the Chancellor, who is still considerably more popular than his party.

The rise in inflation has been checked. It is down to less than 6 per cent. The balance of payments deficit is dwindling, which means that conditions for an economic upswing are improving.

But above all, Bonn has had some foreign policy successes: German-French relations have become more relaxed and Western Europe still orietates itself by Schmidt's Poland policy of moderation; and the Geneva disarmament talks that he helped initiate still hold some promise of success.

Despite friction within the coalition and despite the squabbles within FDP, the policy of the Bonn government is still a credit to the SPD; and constantly complaining party members can only do harm.

They should take the outcome of the Schleswig-Holstein elections as a shot across the bow — the last warning before this year's state elections.

Should the Social Democrats lose all four of these elections, the party-political balance of power in this country would become unhinged for an extended period.

Dieter Buhl

(Die Zeit, 12. March 1982)

Scandals, party wranglings, bring out the cynicism

People cannot be blamed for developing an attitude of cynicism towards the institutions of the State.

This is the result of a series of scandals, cracks in the system. The latest are the trade union movement and the corruption involving the massive building company its owns, Neue Heimat; and the question of irregularities over political party funds.

But none of this touches on the major issues on which no headway is being made while the parties squabble with each other and within themselves.

The most important of these are unemployment, maintaining peace and our relations with the United States.

Behind it all there is also the extent to which the state and its people see themselves as a community in solidarity that should strive for consensus.

The issues are to do with the common good and with selfishness.

But dissatisfaction, no matter how understandable, itself gets no one anywhere.

Neither does it lead to an objective analysis nor does it point the way out of the dilemma. Instead, there is the danger of confusing and blending our basic democratic system with our present situation.

There is no indication as to how the established political parties are to rid themselves of the illusion that they themselves are the state and that this gives them the right to engage in intrigue, graft and manipulation of the electorate.

There is, however, one instrument with which to prove that there is only one sovereign in a democracy: the people who express their political will in the form of a ballot.

Why do our politicians in the confused situation not call on the electorate to make a decision by vote? Why not hold a new Bundestag election?

There are those who will object by pointing to the fact that we already have four elections forthcoming this year (the state elections in Lower Saxony, Hamburg, Hesse and Bavaria).

But the argument fails to convince. The disastrous thing is that most of these state elections are expected to be a national indicator and that the destiny of the Bonn government hinges on them.

This applies above all for Hesse, the only state still governed by a Social-Liberal coalition.

Should the CDU win in Hesse, the pundits are convinced that the survival chances of the Schmidt-Genscher alliance in Bonn would be slim indeed.

The election will also raise the question as to whether the Hesse CDU will want and be able to govern alone or whether it will have to coalesce with the Liberals.

The Hamburg and Lower Saxony elections could also have national repercussions. A new situation could arise if the Hamburg SPD corner fewer votes than the CDU under Leisler Kiep and if the FDP makes a comeback.

We would also be faced with something different if Hanover's Ernst Albrecht fails to gain the absolute majority and allies himself with the Free Democrats.

Only Bavaria is unlikely to provide any impulse for change. Here, the only thing of interest is how well the CSU will do and how poor will be the performance of the other parties.

Considering how much hinges on the state elections this year, why not put an end to all the jitters on the national plane and hold a Bundestag election?

Another argument that could be raised against an early general election is that the Bonn opposition under its interim chancellorship candidate Helmut Kohl has not exactly earned itself laurels, thus presenting itself as the better alternative.

Polls show that the Germans still favour Helmut Schmidt over Helmut Kohl even though they are disenchanted with the SPD/FDP coalition.

But there is also the fact that SPD and FDP are not only at loggerheads with each other but that they no longer stand united behind their Chancellor.

It was pure hypocracy aimed at holding on to power that prompted the two parties to back Chancellor Schmidt in a unanimous vote of confidence.

What the elctorate thinks of the coalition is disregarded in such manoeuvres. A meaningful vote of confidence cannot be cast in parliament alone; it must come from the people.

And, finally, there is the argument that the fathers of the Constitution wanted to prevent Weimar conditions by making the dissolution of parliament rather difficult.

The idea was to enable a once elected Bundestag to act and to keep coalitions, once formed, functioning for four years. This is how it should be — in principle.

Even so, Willy Brandt chose a different course in 1972. He not only had to end the stalemate in the Bundestag, but also wanted the electorate to voice its view on his *Ostpolitik*.

The premise for new elections how would not be so clear-cut; but such an election could nevertheless provide more clarity. In addition, it would act as an indicator of the strength of democracy in this country.

But who wants clarity? The coalition and the Chancellor keep saying that they will stick it out until 1984. The Opposition, on the other hand, waits for the Bonn coalition to break up of its own accord.

Both attitudes lack conviction.

Fritz Aschka

(Nürnberger Nachrichten 10 March 1982)

The centrifugal forces that distinguish the FDP

FDP leader Hans-Dietrich Genscher never tires of stressing the "distinctiveness" of his party.

However, it is not quite a true claim.

The almost unanswerable question is what the criteria is.

If anything is distinctive about the Free Democrats it is the centrifugal forces within the party that drive it apart.

This was clearly demonstrated at the latest congress in Duisburg of the party's young members' branch which called on Genscher to review his position of "openness to all sides".

The political infighting in the party has made the leading role of the chairman himself come under fire.

Genscher has now demonstratively committed himself on a rather important point by upholding his support of his fellow party members in the Berlin legislature who had been censured by the party's left wingers.

Genscher can see his party break up into two factions: a liberal-conservative and a left-liberal wing.

This could have disastrous consequences for the FDP's scope of action, for there are four important state elections coming up.


Klaus B. Harms

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 8 March 1982)

■ MIGRANTS

Land premiers work out blueprint for slowing influx to a trickle

Land Premiers have agreed to limit refugee quotas and to call for legislation to make it harder to qualify for political asylum, to reduce (from 16) the maximum age at which children may join their (foreign) parents in Germany and to stall beyond 1986 on proposed freedom to live and work in Germany of Turkish nationals as citizens of a Common Market country. Incentives are also to be offered to foreign residents, especially those out of work, to return to their native countries.



Hostility towards foreigners is growing in Germany. Yet most people don't want to remember that in the late 1960s, when German industry was starved of labour,the one millionth Turkish worker was presented with a TV set.

There are some two million foreign workers here. Including families there are 4.5 million Turks, Spaniards, Greeks, Portuguese and others.

It is generally agreed now that Germany has reached or exceeded its capacity to absorb foreigners.

Ways are being sought to stop the influx, and where appropriate to encourage repatriation.

Politicians are worried by the growing public xenophobia and the diminishing willingness to integrate.

Highly regarded opinion researchers say that the mood has changed radically over the past few years.

At the end of 1978 39 per cent of Germans wanted foreigners to return home. By December 1981, this figure had risen to 66 per cent.

Every second German now says that even foreign children who were born in this country should be denied a permanent residence permit — compared with 27 per cent three years ago.

Only 11 per cent of Germans now favour integration help for foreigners compared with 42 per cent in 1978.

These figures reflect irrational fears which rightist groups such as *Bürgerinitiative Ausländerstop* (citizens' initiative to stop the foreigners) are only too happy to exploit.

This xenophobia is partly due to an undercurrent of fear of diluting national identity; but there is also the concern over being displaced from jobs in a time of economic crisis.

The fact that this has little to do with actual realities has little effect on the mood. Sociologists are certain that the public's attitude towards foreigners has long become ingrained.

These are boom days for those who like to oversimplify things. For example, there are those who suggestively ask if, without foreigners, would we not have less crime; less acute housing *shortage; and full employment?*

Unfortunately, this sort of sloganeering meets with a frighteningly strong public response.

Three-quarters of Germans actually say foreigners are the cause of many German problems.

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt found himself reminded of the time when "we blamed everything that bothered us on the Jews."

It is well worth pondering. Many of the lessons dating back to the darkest era of our history are fading in the memory.

The undeniable abuse of the right to asylum in this country has convinced three out of four citizens that all asylum seekers are simply trying to improve their economic position.

Fifty six per cent of Germans want more stringent yardsticks for poli refugees.

Most even say that people who genuinely politically persecuted home should still be rejected.

This is a shaming testimony fo country from which, close to 50 y ago, tens of thousands were forced flee and seek shelter in neighbou countries.

Genuine guest workers, who do live at the expense of Germans but taxes and help finance social secu and health insurance, are lumped to ther with those who seek asylum in t country for economic reasons and usually draw welfare.

Relations between Germans and reigners are marked by misunder dings and misconceptions.

For instance, 70 per cent of Gern believe that guest workers want to l here permanently.

Yet the foreigners' ties to their cultures are so strong even after an tended stay in Germany that 75 per are determined to return home.

Only 6.6 per cent want to bec German citizens. Equally uninformed the widespread view that the repat tion would cut unemployment heav.

Foreign workers from Europ Community countries are here by ri and most of those from non-EEC co tries have long-term residence and w permits.

But even if this were not so, and reigners all went home, most of the sultant jobs would be anything but tractive to Germans.

If highly skilled industrial and c cal workers were to be asked to t some of the jobs now filled by fo gners they would be outraged.

Trying to cope with this hostility wards foreigners means an all-out inf mation campaign.

Joachim Haal

(Nürnberger Nachrichten, 3 March)

German state prime ministers of all parties agree that Germany has exceed its capacity to absorb foreigners.

The disquieting thing, the prime ministers say, is not the financial burden but the growing hostility to foreigners.

This could one day erupt and threaten social peace.

The premiers all say they cannot allow the situation to continue.

The constitutional guarantee of the right to asylum for political refugees cannot be met if absorbtion capacity is strained.

Threat to social peace main concern of ministers

Those political asylum seekers who in fact are seeking economic improvement stand in the way of the genuine asylum seeker.

And many legal experts no longer interpret the relevant article of the Constitution as meaning that a haven must be provided for all comers.

Germany brought the guest workers to Germany and cannot simply send them back.

But they did not come to this country to be charitable to us and we didn't expect them to be joined by the entire clan.

To prevent demagogues from using the vast number of foreigners in this country for propaganda, a restrictive aliens policy must be pursued.

Contrary to generalisations, xenophobia is not a deep-rooted characteristic of the Germans. Instead, Germans initially tend to admire everything exotic.

Those who in the mass media constantly show overcrowded foreigners' quarters, dirty back yards and filthy lavatories tell more about the mentality of certain newsmen than about the attitude of Germans towards aliens. As a rule, this attitude is not unfriendly.

The aliens problem is essentially a problem of Turks. Everybody senses this.

Turkish families keep growing, the Bonn government hesitates to im se stiff restrictions on the immigra of next-of-kin out of consideration the somewhat unstable Nato mem Turkey.

In 1986 when, under the EEC As ciation Treaty with Turkey, free mo ment of labour comes into effect, other tide of millions of Turks will gulf this country.

The present ghettos would becom state within the state; and those t think that a Germanisation would possible (like the Poles were Germ sed in the Ruhr area) overlook the d ferences in mentality and the refusal most Turks to integrate.

The chancellor and the state pri ministers do not want to restrict the selves to mere measures to stem t tide. Financial incentives are to ma repatriation more palatable.

German development aid could cr te more jobs in Turkey by provid that country with German plant Turkish workers.

This is one scenario for the futu but it presupposes economic stability the Federal Republic of Germany. An unchecked tide of foreigners would only jeopardise the German econo but also the capacity to provide ass tance.

(General-Anzeiger Bonn, 6 March 19

Proposals would mean end of a proud political principle

The intended stiff measures to curb the influx of foreigners are a two-edged sword.

They will mitigate the social and financial problems posed by the current 4.6 million aliens in this country.

But they would also mean restricting a political principle that was once a reason for pride: open borders for all who need them.

If we were not to accept only those Vietnam refugees who are picked out of the sea, we must ask ourselves what is to become of others whose fate is the ordinary one of not having a roof over their heads.

And if foreign workers are to be allowed to bring in their families only after a strict sifting process, we would deprive people whose labour we need of the right to lead a normal family life.

The conditions used to justify such measures are an old chestnut: Bonn and the *Länder* simply don't have enough money to accommodate the legions of asylum seekers and refugees in general.

The concentration of foreign workers in certain regions has created ghettos whose inhabitants lead a life of their own and are becoming an irritation to the German public.

Aliens now account for seven per cent of the total population in this country.

France, Belgium and Switzerland have considerably higher proportions.

Are we perhaps less prepared to accept economic drawbacks on behalf of the foreigners whom we ourselves brought to this country to further our economy?

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 6 March 1982)

■ THE WAGE ROUND

Ruhr steelworkers set the pace with 4.2 per cent

The first agreement in this year's wage round, 4.2 per cent in iron and steel, is lower than it was last year and took less time to reach.

Given the economic outlook, the deal seems to be an encouraging sign.

Both unions and employers seem keen to follow in North Rhine-Westphalia's footsteps and agree to identical terms elsewhere.

So relief has been widespread and the example set at the first key round of wage talks, held this year in Krefeld in the Ruhr, could catch on.

Iron and steel employers energetically resisted until the last moment a wage increase of more than three per cent, just as last year they sought to avoid conceding five and the year before seven per cent.

Last year's increase was 4.9 per cent, plus flat-rate payments that took the percentage to well over five.

This year the employers planned to offer no more than 3.9 per cent, or so it seems, which was ambitious indeed: wage increases one per cent lower with inflation running at roughly six per cent in both 1981 and 1982.

But as negotiations came to a head it was clear that less than four per cent would have meant industrial action.

The unions might have had difficulty in persuading public opinion that strikes were worthwhile for the last few tenths of a per cent, but the strike threat had to be taken seriously.

So by offering 4.2 per cent and a flat-rate bonus of DM120 for February the employers have averted labour disputes and possibly more.

They have avoided putting their new-found determination to the test. Last year, iron and steel employers in North Rhine-Westphalia took a hard line and were let down by their counterparts in Baden-Württemberg.

Employers down south were better off and could afford to agree to terms employers in the Rhine and Ruhr regions had turned down flat.

The employers were on bad terms with each other for a while, then resolved to close ranks and not break them come what might.

Maybe they would have done, but who can say for sure what would have happened if arbitration in North Rhine-Westphalia had failed?

Agreement might again have been reached on costlier terms in another part of the country, so the employers may have agreed to 4.2 per cent in Krefeld to be on the safe side.

It is even harder to say what effect the Neue Heimat affair may have had on the wage negotiations. It was certainly a blow to the prestige of the trade union movement.

But IG Metall, the 2.7m-strong metalworkers' union, will not have been so hard hit that it was determined at all costs to avoid industrial action.

The employers were well advised not even to attempt to capitalise on this possible weakness of their opposite number at the wage talks.

Once trade unions forfeit prestige among employees they are correspondingly less useful as parties to collective bargaining. So a decline in the confidence in which they are held is not in the employers' interest either.

The employers are sure to have been happy to allow IG Metall a reasonable wage increase, an increase the union could "sell" to its members.

This is not to say that the union negotiators gained all their demands, not even if the initial union claim of 7.5 per cent is dismissed as the usual exaggerated demand.

IG Metall was keen indeed to negotiate terms that would at least have offset nominal inflation, and inflation is sure to be more than 4.2 per cent.

This is a certainty even if one allows for the flat-rate bonus for February bringing the percentage up in the lower wage group and for inflation easing up as the year goes on.

The February bonus is fine for the lower wage groups but it only increases their percentage improvement for that one month.

There have been demands for a minimum flat-rate increase to apply for the duration of the agreement, but they made no headway.

The iron and steel terms are, as always, a pointer for the economy as a whole. They will allow public service workers to settle for a little less in return for their job security.

So for two years in succession wage increases have been lower than inflation, meaning that the money in their

Continued on page 7

A figure that both sides should be able to live with

The wage agreement in the North Rhine-Westphalian iron and steel industry may not rule out disputes in other parts of the country.

But it is a feather in the caps of arbitrators Werner Figgen and Hans Wertz, mayor of Hamm and administrative board chairman of the Bundesbahn respectively.

Arbitration using independent men on whom both sides agree has been shown to be an integral, working part of collective bargaining.

So there is no reason to sneer at arbitration as some unionists do who evidently prefer industrial action to peaceful agreement.


Let them think again. In the difficult years that lie ahead strike talk, playing on hopes that cannot possibly be fulfilled, will get the unions nowhere.

Both the union and the employers' negotiators likewise deserve credit for having aimed at swift agreement after last year's protracted wage talks, in which agreement was not reached until early in May.


The employers did not insist on less than four per cent. They chose to be realistic, appreaciating that anything else would have prompted a wave of strikes despite the economic outlook

And the state of the economy is by no means good. There is mass unemployment and a record number of companies are having to call in the receiver and to go into liquidation.

But there are still companies that are in a sound position, especially in export-orientated iron and steel, and they would have been first to face strike action.



Hans Wertz . . . feather in his cap.



Werner Figgen . . . and in his, too.
(Photos: Sven Simon)

Experience has shown that even after weeks of bargaining the outcome of wage talks could well have been no better for either side than the terms agreed in Krefeld.

So the employers should be in a position to persuade doubters in their ranks that a wage offer of 4.2 rather than 3.9 per cent was a small price to pay for social peace and a swift end to uncertainty.

IG Metall, the union, can live with 4.2 per cent too. The latest statistics indicate that inflation could well be below five per cent by the end of the year.

And wage- and salary-earners have arguably grown accustomed to wage rate increases lower than the official inflation rate.

The flat-rate bonus of DM120 for February is an acceptable solution to demands for a better deal for the lower wage groups, demands made especially in Baden-Württemberg.

A similar solution to this problem was arrived at last year too, so IG Metall unionists in Baden-Württemberg can hardly object on principle.

So it is now up to the parties to collective bargain in the public service to make their contribution to a change for the better in wage bargaining in the 80s.

(General Anzeiger Bonn, 8 March 1982)

■ PERSPECTIVES

The Ugly German has changed politics from right to left

For over a century the civilised world knew exactly what the Ugly German looked like. He began as the hero of Heinrich Mann's novel *Der Untertan*.

Mann's Wilhelminian Ugly German was both servile and arrogant, proudly wearing both the sword-slashed features that were the hallmark of a university student and the loyalty to the state he felt he owed it as a German.

After the First World War the Ugly German underwent a gradual change. As seen by George Grosz, the Wilhelminian *Untertan*, or subject, assumed a more brutal, wheeler-dealer air.

Via the swastika armband and riding breeches of the Third Reich we arrived at the *Wirtschaftswunder* Ugly German of what was hailed as Germany's post-war economic miracle.

Each in his way the embodiment of the authoritarian, undemocratic superman. Now, suddenly, to judge by what we are told by some Western pundits, the Ugly German is in a state of flux.

He suddenly wears jeans, has long hair and a beard and is either gentle but mad or a Marxist fanatic. In other words, the Ugly German has moved from the right to the left of the political spectrum.

Where he used to jeopardise democratic civilisation by means of his militarism, his Teutonic fury and his lust for conquest, he now threatens the West with his pacifism, his malingering and his yes-man outlook.

It is even said that the proverbial *Drang nach Osten*, or drive to the East, has undergone a 180-degree change and that it is now aimed at an embrace and no longer at murderous confrontation with the Eastern Bloc.

Is this all merely a matter of the major realignment in the United States, a realignment that, whether we like it or not, is more than just the change-over from a peanut farmer to a film star?

It certainly is, but that is not all it amounts to. France currently has a socialist government and French official outrage at Bonn's attitude on the Polish crisis is no less marked than ill-humour on the other side of the Atlantic.

So there must be a telling reason for this new-found mistrust on our neighbours' part, a reason that goes beyond their left- or right-wing views.

I believe the reason can be stated, and for once it is a reason for which we Germans can hardly be blamed.

It is that no-one in the West can imagine the Germans no longer being a nation and no longer acting as one. Let me explain.

For all Western nations the emergence of their nation-states is and has always been the logical culmination of their history.

Germany, according to the view held in the days when European history was seen in a less convulsive light, was united late in the day but set about the task and accomplished it no less consistently than Italy did.

It was united under Bismarck at roughly the same time as the American civil war, in which unity was likewise at stake, and as the warlike unification of Italy under the House of Savoy.

Germany had thus, in the eyes of the common philosophical outlook of the West, joined the mainstream of political and social progress.

As a logical consequence of the situation in 1945 Germany was divided. It seems reasonable to assume this division was not initially intended by any of the Allies, not even the Russians.

If they had permanent division in mind the zones of occupation as laid down would not have made much sense, especially the position in Berlin.

The situation in Berlin only makes sense if one assumes that in 1945 the Allies were still agreed that the division of Germany, in other words the end of the German nation, could not and would not be a long-term arrangement.

The end of Germany has since emerged as the foremost precondition of the precarious stability of the international system.

Any serious discussion of a restoration of German nationhood would be a serious threat to the prevailing East-West conflict, a conflict which, like all major conflicts in history, is based on tacit agreement on a common scenario.

So the situation is that at the back of the West's mind there is a deep-seated but usually unspoken conviction that the Germans are a nation like any other and must, in the final analysis, aim at restoration of a German nation-state with every fibre of their being.

This desire was for generations accepted as only natural on the Poles' part.

At the same time it is realised only too well that nothing worse could happen to upset the balance in the current conflict than any move at all by the Germans aimed at restoring national unity.

This is the crux of the dilemma. Anything that indicates the slightest degree of independence in German policies, regardless in which direction, is bound to lead at the back of all Western minds to suspicions that Bonn (or East Berlin) is again aiming at *Deutschland über alles*.

Similar suspicions probably lurk at the back of Kremlin minds too. GDR problems are certainly viewed with a special degree of nervousness in the Eastern Bloc.

So all signs will be registered with pleasure that seem to indicate that neither Bonn nor East Berlin has any intention of pursuing truly national intra-German policies.

Conversely, any sign of independent initiative, and be it only a courtesy visit to the GDR by a Bonn Chancellor, is bound to be viewed in terms of nation-state ideology. German reunification is felt to be just around the corner.

Take so-called detente. When Willy Brandt pursued detente he was the greatest, merely because detente at the time was in keeping with the policy line of the West.

Now Helmut Schmidt continues to pursue detente even though the overall political climate has otherwise changed, there inevitably seem to be nightmare visions of Germany trying to regain its historically logical role as a natio[n-sta]te.

We will make no headway by p[...] our heads together and all procla[iming] in unison that, to quote Günter G[...] Bonn's former man in East Berlin, [we] care not a fig for German reunificat[ion].

No-one believes us. There will al[ways] be a reference to what *Time* maga[zine] recently wrote was the "nearly my[stical] goal of German reunification."

So let us pull ourselves together [...] be prepared, doing what we as Ger[mans] feel is right and important.

Let us talk with each other, fo[r in]stance, as writers from East and [West] Germany on how to keep the pea[ce, as] was done in West Berlin on 14 De[cem]ber 1981.

Let us talk about keeping the p[eace] and about nothing else, and let us [...] for ourselves our true and deeply [...] conviction that the days of the na[tion-]state are nearly over.

It is no longer capable of perfor[ming] the simplest tasks for which it was [desi]gned, such as the French defence [doc]trine. But to say no would be to [...] most of our friends in East and [West] unneccessarily.

So let me conclude with a pers[onal] comment. It is a surprisingly plea[sant] but slightly alarming feeling for s[ome]one who has been engaged in co[...] and national criticism for decades [to be] able to put in a good word for the G[er]mans, for his Germans, at an i[nter]national gathering for once.

One can but hope it will not be [the] last opportunity.

Carl Am[...]

(Vorwärts, 28 January [...])

Torment over Stalin's plan

Bonn Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, 76, was on his way to the Hotel Petersberg for more talks with the high commissioners of the three Western powers when the political bombshell burst.

He was negotiating the terms by which the Federal Republic of Germany was to be incorporated in the Western alliance when Stalin offered to sign a peace treaty with a Germany reunited in neutrality!

In the German Democratic Republic, as the Soviet Zone had styled itself for the past two-and-a-half years, the government-controlled Press and radio ran special issues and extra bulletins with the news.

The Soviet Union had submitted comprehensive proposals for a peace treaty with Germany including reunification within borders extending to the Oder-Neisse line and permanent neutrality.

They were outlined in Stalin's note of 10 March 1952, which has left its traces to this day, 30 years and a generation later.

Was there any real chance, shortly before the Federal Republic joined Nato, of ending the division of Germany, even at the price of abandoning all claim to the German Eastern territories?

This question was asked with greater feeling than it is today before the detente policy pursued by Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr in the early 70s.

But no-one was able to answer it conclusively and no-one is in a position to do so.

At the end of January 1955, when the Bundestag was on the point of ratifying Bonn's decision to join Nato, Erich Ollenhauer, leader of the SPD Opposition, wrote to Chancellor Adenauer:

"In 1952 no attempt was made to test the earnest in which the Soviet Union's offer was made. To fail to do so again would be an omission that could not be answered for to the German people."

Three years later, in a memorable late-night Bundestag debate on whether to equip the Bundeswehr with nuclear launcher weapons, two former Cabinet Ministers of the aging Chancellor attacked him heatedly.

They were Gustav Heinemann, a former CDU Interior Minister who was later to serve as SPD Justice Minister and head of state, and Thomas Dehler of the Free Democrats.

It was January 1958 and both men rubbed salt in the old wound that in 1952 an opportunity of reuniting Germany had been ignored.

But did the Soviet Union seriously intend to allow Germany to be reunited? The main points of a memorandum submitted by the Soviet ambassadors to the US, British and French governments on 10 March 1952, a year before Stalin died, were:

- Germany was to be re-established as a state and the reunited Germany was to be given an opportunity of developing as an independent, democratic and peace-loving state.
- Germany was to undertake not to join military pacts of any kind that were directed against any country whose armed forces had taken part in the war on Germany.
- Germany was to be allowed to maintain armed forces of its own to defend the country and to set up in arms manufacture in keeping with its needs.

What the note did not include was the offer of free and secret elections under international supervision to app[oint] an all-German government.

This omission, doubtless no co[inci]dence, provided the Bundestag maj[ority] led by Dr Adenauer and consisti[ng of] the CDU, the CSU, the FDP a[nd the] Deutsche Partei, with good rea[son for] viewing the Soviet offer with [...] rather than with jubilation.

It was obvious that Stalin was kee[n to] keep the larger part of the defe[ated] country, with the overwhelming maj[ori]ty of Germany and much the great[er in]dustrial potential, out of the Wester[n al]liance.

Besides, as the wording of the [note] indicated, Moscow aimed not on[ly at a] neutral Germany but also, in the [long] run, at a communist-orientated G[erma]ny.

It referred expressly to the 194[5 Pots]dam Agreement and its use of [terms] such as peace-loving and anti[...] that were intended to character[ise de]lopments along lines favoured [by the] Soviet Union.

What was the significance of [the] March 1952 note? The question is [...] ne for historians rather than politic[ians] since it is now of little real importa[nce] for the course of history.

The Social Democrats, led by He[rbert] Wehner, came round to Adena[uer's] pro-Western course in June 1960 [...] when not even they have wondered [any] longer whether a historic opport[unity] was missed.

Even so, it would have done n[o harm] if the West at the time had sou[nded out] the Soviet proposals a little mo[re tho]roughly rather than standing alo[of from] them from the start.

Had it done so we would have [been] spared many a tormented questi[on in] subsequent debate.

Joachim Sobot[ta]

(Rheinische Post, 6 [March 1982])

■ ENERGY

To find oil you need earth samples, a few schoolboy facts and a computer

Oil companies are now able to make huge cash savings by using a computer to simulate petroleum deposit charts.

The system, developed at Jülich nuclear research station, combines basic regional information yielded by drilling with simple principles about how oil forms.

The computer works out the probabilities.

Geologists usually drill at about 30 points to get a rough picture of a sediment basin.

Now a handful of drillings are needed, sharply reducing a time-consuming and costly process.

The Jülich researchers, headed by Professor Dietrich Welte, have run thousands of analyses for both companies and governments all over the world.

The project was developed at the research station's Institute of Petroleum and Organic Geochemistry.

Professor Welte, who has headed the institute since 1975, says he and his staff can in effect simulate 70 million years of petroleum geology history in an afternoon to produce the charts.

He says no one else in the world has developed such a project.

The Institute employs a team of scientists in many disciplines to find out more about how petroleum is created.

Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger

Oil and natural gas usage drop

Primary energy use 1981

In millions of tonnes of coal equivalent

	1980	1981
Total	390.2	371.0 (−5%)
Oil	165.7	155.0
Bituminous coal	77.1	78.5
Natural gas	63.6	59.0
Lignite	39.2	40.0
Atom power		17.2 (+20%)
Hydro-electric power		8.4 (+10%)
Imported electricity, other (wood etc)		2.9 (+6%)

Source: Arbeitsgemeinschaft Energiebilanzen

[The] whole nation used a total of 5 per [cent] less primary energy last year com[pared] with 1980. The big savers were oil [and n]atural gas. Other forms of energy [were a]ctually used more, including coal, [atomic] power and even wood.

Petroleum develops from the remains of animal life in what once were tropical oceans.

The researchers aim to find out how many hydrocarbons are to be found in specific geological formations and what kinds of organic matter are deposited in sediment.

Once they have found the answers they can answer other questions, such as how much and what quality of petroleum is likely to be found in specific deposits.

At the Jülich laboratories thousands of samples from drilling operations all over the world have been exhaustively analysed and the findings fed to a computer.

Petroleum is formed mainly in sediment basins in bedrock, such as dark clay or carbonate. The clay accumulated in quiet marine backwaters millions of years ago.

Phytoplankton and bacteria were incorporated in the clay, which as time went by was covered in thicker and thicker layers of sediment.

Pressure and temperature in the parent rock steadily increased. A process known as catagenesis is triggered once the temperature exceeds certain levels.

The complex hydrocarbon molecules of the plankton are disintegrated and split into liquid and gas: petroleum and natural gas respectively.

The variety of crude oil that results will depend to a large extent on the temperature at which the process takes place. Arabian light oil originated in conditions entirely different to those of Venezuelan oil, for instance.

The oil forms in the parent rock until the prevailing temperature is no longer enough to split the molecules further.

Since crude oil is lighter than water it gradually seeps to the earth's surface, being caught in storage formations.

These formations are soaked full of oil like a sponge full of water. They only yield their contents when the rock is drilled.

The Jülich research scientists have succeeded in expressing the processes of sedimentation, oil formation and oil displacement in mathematical formulas.

These formulas are fed, together with initial drilling data, to the computer. Professor Welte says his process might be able to find oil where none was thought to be.

A few years ago computer simulation of such complex processes would have been out of the question. Computers were far to small and slow to handle such enormous programmes.

"The results," Professor Welte says, "are outstanding where strata have either remained undisturbed or been disturbed to only a limited extent."

But if there are too many rifts and faults the formulas are not yet exact enough to simulate patterns satisfactorily. So the Jülich scientists are trying to perfect it.

Fuel and power are ever present at Jülich, where bucketwheel dredgers carve their way through the open-cast brown coal workings behind the research laboratories.

In front of them, as seen from Professor Welte's office, is a building that houses a nuclear reactor.

Sandwiched in between, he and his staff deal with petroleum. They would seem to be the odd men out at an atomic energy facility.

But Professor Welte says most of Germany's energy requirements are still met by liquid hydrocarbon, or crude oil, and in comparison with the nuclear research budget a mere pittance is invested in learning more about where oil reserves might yet be found.

Horst Rademacher

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 5 March 1982)

Extracting motor fuel from coal 'too costly to be practicable'

Extracting motor fuel and heating oil by coal liquefaction is too expensive to be feasible, says a report by Veba Öl, of Düsseldorf.

Liquefaction could only be done on a large scale if it were heavily subsidised.

It would not even be profitable if cheap imported coal were used together with waste oil from domestic refineries.

Technically, the report says, liquefaction could be done industrially on the basis of an improved version of the Bergius-Pier process that is satisfactory from the environmental angle, except that it might be too noisy.

This would lead to protest and delays, possibly even to abandonment.

The Bergius process was first used to manufacture synthetic motor fuel from coal in 1927. In the Second World War it played a key part in Germany's war effort.

The Veba report, compiled for the Bonn government in association with Linde, Veba-Lurgi and Chemische Werke Hüls, runs to 20 volumes.

It and two others commissioned by Bon will be used to reach a decision some time this summer on whether to go ahead and invest government money in a full-scale coal liquefaction pilot project.

Veba say a facility to process 3.7 million tonnes of coal a year would cost, in 1981 prices, about DM6bn in investment.

Since it would not be completed until about 1990, a further DM1.7bn would be run up in interest and tax payments.

Losses would not end there. Initial running could be expected to total losses of between DM770m and DM1.4bn a year, depending whether imported coal and waste refinery oil were used or, the DM1.4bn loser, domestic coal.

Annual output would be an estimated two million tonnes of liquid hydrocarbons: 850,000 tonnes of motor fuel, 850,000 tonnes of light heating oil and 250,000 tonnes of liquid gas.

The loss per kilogram would be between 40 and 70 pfennigs, so the cost price of motor fuel at today's prices would be DM2.37 per litre.

Assuming the cost of coal increased by seven and that of oil by eight per cent a year, coal liquefaction using domestic coal would not be economic until the plant had been running for 14 years.

Combining imported coal and refinery waste, the break-even point would, it is said, be reached by the sixth year of operations.

But this is quietly to ignore the losses that would by then have accumulated. So the report concludes that the economic risk would be beyond the scope of private enterprise.

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 3 March 1982)

■ THE ARTS

A triumphant tribute to the golden age of Spanish painting

En route from Madrid to Vienna the magnificent Greco to Goya exhibition has stopped over in Munich, where it will be on show in the Haus der Kunst until the end of April.

It is the first time such a triumphant tribute to the golden age of Spanish painting has been paid outside Spain. The list of works on loan is a marvel in itself.

More than 100 paintings are listed in the informative but, in the quality of its colour reproductions, at times less than superb catalogue.

Hardly any are second-rate. Still fewer are fillers.

There are eight works by El Greco, including major work from Madrid and Toledo, and 10 paintings by Velazquez, including Infante Don Fernando as a Huntsman, the two Vienna paintings of the Infanta and the Portraits of Don Sebastian de Morra.

There are nine paintings by Zurbaran, seven by Ribera, 12 (in a room of their own) by Murillo and 13 of Goya's best, including The Colossus, or Panic, and a major self-portrait.

Then there are many other first-rate works by artists never before exhibited in Germany.

The Munich exhibition is a unique, virtually never-to-be-repeated festival of painting arranged in happy cooperation between the Haus der Kunst and the Bayerische Staatsgemäldesammlungen.

It is due even more to the understanding shown by the Spanish authorities and to cooperation between the three leading collections of Spanish art in Europe.

They are the Prado in Madrid and the Kunsthistorisches Museum in Vienna as the custodians of the Habsburg heritage and the Alte Pinakothek in Munich.

The Munich gallery looks after what until the 19th century was the most important collection of Spanish art outside Spain, the collection built up by the Bavarian royal family and extended by the state and by donors from the banking world.

Many German and foreign museums also loaned works, especially the Budapest Museum of Creative Arts, which lent 12 masterpieces testifying to the international standing of its Spanish section.

The result is an exhibition for which there has been felt to be a need for nearly 20 years: a representative show of Spanish painting over four centuries.

Chronological order is only loosely kept to and the presentation makes do without flourish. The paintings are simply hung on walls and partitions to convey an impressive overall impression.

It provides only samples, with the result that historic proportions are sometimes a little askew; there are no still-lives by J. S. Cotan, for instance.

But the selection does justice to the special position and special achievements of Spanish painting as an independent force, the extreme opposites of expression, especially in the portrait.

They show the tension between ideal and reality, between ecstatic religiosity and a blunt and even brutal awareness of reality, between courtly ceremony and distinctive individualism.

They likewise show the tension between an aristocratic air and heated emotion, between pathos and touching human love of truth.

Such contradictions as these still seem strange to a Central Europe. They seem Spanish, as the Germans say, and at times altogether exotic.


They are definitely not accounted for satisfactorily by a reference to the manneristic, baroque intellectual outlook or to an allegedly typically Spanish attitude.

For centuries Spain was on the outskirts of Europe, which partly accounts for a degree of separate development.

It set itself the mission of the Counter-Reformation. It was keen to defend the Catholic Church in a changing world and to spread its message in a popular way.

But there was enormous tension between strict spiritual pretensions and the often sad reality of rigid Spanish society.

In the range of subjects chosen, if in no other respect, patronage by the court and the Church to the exclusion of a self-assured bourgeoisie had a detrimental effect.



Goya's The Parasol (1777) (Photos: catalogue)



El Greco's St. John (1600)

A number of baroque topics are almost entirely missing in Spanish art, and even the proverbial Spanish realism is firmly embedded in a pious, religious outlook. No attention is paid to the profane, to nature in its animal nudity or its heroic landscaping; none to the mythology of the Ancient World. The legitimate subjects for portrayal on canvas are belief and man in God's image, the saints and the anointed. We are nonetheless captivated by Spanish painting: by the psychologically profound humanity wrung from a strict canon, by the artistically sublimated beauty and vitality and by the sense of reality that comes through all propaganda of the faith and piety.

It is a sense that comes through the devotion of monks gazing heavenward and even through the cuteness of Murillo's idyllic beggars and small boys.

In a characteristic manner the immaterial, clerico-intellectual life corresponds to the earth-brown rags-and-tatters life of tramps and hawkers.

The golden-hued, dramatically illuminated production of the contrasts between heaven and earth are exactly attuned to the Janus-headed narrative world of a Cervantes.

Stylistically, Spanish painting remains contradictory and lacking in uniformity until Goya. Classical, mannerist and baroque tendencies long clash, as do Italian and, later, Flemish influences.

In differing degrees of intensity the dramatic, drastic, black-and-white painting of Caravaggio reigns supreme in Spanish schools of art from Madrid to Valencia, although one tends to forget this fact in view of their superb portrayals of humanity.

El Greco's flickering expressionism is a blend of Byzantine icon painting, his Cretan origins and a Venetian glow of colour.

His ecstatically elongated portrayals of suffering, as in The Disrobing, are entirely devoted to a glowing zig-zag of gestures, folds and sheet lightning.

His initially glaring colour symbolism is expressed more cursorily in the red-and-green contrast of John the Baptist. Biblical events are transfigured, become a spiritual vision of light in his Madrid Coronation of the Virgin Mary.

Yet we are also shown, in the stern portrait of a doctor, that El Greco was the first great painter of the human individual.

A key part in the emergence of a Spanish style of painting was played by the Caravaggio followers Francisco Ribalta, whose Christ Appearing to St Bernard forms part of the exhibition, and Jose de Ribera, a pupil of his who worked in Naples.

Ribera's gloomy Maddalena Ventura portrays almost in cold blood the anomaly of a man-like, bearded woman and her baby, and behind them the embittered face of her hard-hit husband.

His later Mary Magdalene opts for monumental composition combined with sensual Flemish pleasure in colour.

In Seville, a metropolitan city, a still life school takes shape. Its earliest representatives are clearly seen to retain allegorical references to the fleeting nature of life on earth.

Francisco Herrera the Elder's Blind Organist boasts an almost Dutch realism that is as far removed from the average as Francisco Zurbaran's ecstatic saints are typical of it.

But we are much more fascinated by Zurbaran's expressive portraits, such as St Casilda, and his magnificent still lives.

Seldom can the magic isolation of light-transfiguring objects, the pastel aroma of material have been painted more suggestively and more enigmatically than in his two versions of the Bodegon with four vessels.

From 1650 Zurbaran's influence declines, while that of Murillo gains ground. Rubens and Reni were the painters on whom Murillo, the master of poetically softened painting, modelled his work.

It stands for a bourgeois piety that was soon to decline into the kitsch of objects of devotion.

Diego Velazquez, a portrait painter in Madrid from 1623, took the art of painting human portraits to its height.

The discoveries of the Munich exhibition are less the major works than the paintings by lesser-known artists such as Palacios and Melendes, Cano and Careno de Miranda, Claudio Coello and Maino, del Mazo, Pereda, Rizzi and Valdes Leal.


It took Goya to end the decline of Spanish painting in the 18th century. He combined a variety of trends, developing from a courtly rococo painter to the greatest social critic of his age and an artist who in some works seems poised to enter the 20th century.

Goya's critical reason and surreal vision, his inexorable observation of mankind and artistic sensuality lead time and again to outbursts of lethal passion.

Continued on page 12

■ MEDICINE

Flu vaccinations: today's knockout punch becomes tomorrow's wet sponge



Vaccinations against influenza are only effective for a limited period because the viruses keep changing.

This is why many people get flu despite innoculations.

What researchers have to do is predict how viruses will change and modify the serum accordingly.

Delegates to a congress at Cologne University heard that scientists would probably come up with the answer within five or ten years.

Professor Stephan Fazekas de St. Groth, of the Basel Institute for Immunology, demonstrated how the virus changes, caused by a single protein molecule, occur.

He used the example of a glove, representing the body's antibodies, and a hand, as the virus.

In the first year, the immunised body fits the attacking glove perfectly.

But a year later, the virus has developed a longer finger. The glove no longer fits and the result is flu.

It can also happen that the finger shortens again, so the immunised defence mechanism is able to work once more.

But this mutation game comes in many variations and continues over the years. No one yet knows how or why.

Serums consist of dead viruses against which man can develop antibodies without actually becoming ill.

To make them effective long-term prior knowledge or educated guesswork about virus changes essential.

The World Health Organisation has been working on guessing ahead.

John Skehel, director of the WHO Anti-Flu Centre, told the congress that the only thing that can be done against flu is still to innoculate — even though there can be no guarantee of success.

A phenomenon: it appears that after 12 years flu viruses lose their ability to change.

Instead, statistics show that entirely new sub-species of flu emerge somewhere in the world.

No one is immune, so epidemics break out. The whole cycle of research and immunisation begins again.

The last of the big epidemics caused by a new virus was Hong Kong flu, which came from Asia in 1968 and swept through Europe.

Another new virus is expected to break out at any time.

However, Hong Kong flu was not a brand new virus: it had caused an epidemic 70 years before but did not strike again because people developed immunity.

But 70 years later, it was able to come out of the woodwork with devastating effect, because anyone with immunity also happened to be dead.

Something similar happened in 1957 when an 1889 virus made a comeback.

It originated in Russia, where the name grippe, meaning cold, entered the vocabulary.

But scientists say that these two examples are exceptions rather than the rule: the 12-year emergence of new sub-species is more common.

Many questions remain unanswered:

- Why the 12-year cycle?
- Why does only one virus at a time hit the world?
- What happens to the varieties that lie dormant for so long?
- Why do the viruses have such sophisticated mutation mechanisms?
- Why does the flu hit only in the cold season, or wet season in the tropics?

Today's anti-flu innoculations are based on economic considerations (costly vaccine versus absenteeism due to illness) rather than a drive to eradicate the last of the major epidemic diseases.

Even though flu causes epidemics, it would be wrong to describe it as one of the great scourges. Fatalities are ra

Continued on page 15

Tests reveal grandpa manages to keep it up for years



Men remain potent until they are very old, according to a Max Planck Society study.

It also reveals that the sexual capacity of healthy older men is "unexpectedly high" in comparison with younger men.

The survey investigated 23 grandfathers aged between 60 and 89 and 20 fathers aged between 24 and 33.

It was carried out by the Clinical Research Group for Reproductive Medicine at the Münster University Hospital. The Research Group is part of the Max Planck Society.


The study contradicts medical theory that, similar to the menopause in women, men begin a biological change of life between 40 and 60, when they become impotent.

According to the study, a "pill for men" would have to be taken throughout life.

But the research team's Professor Eberhard Nieschlag points out: "The problem is that there is no such thing as a drug without side effects."

(Westdeutsche Allgemeine, 4 March 1982)





■ SOCIETY

The nation gets round to counting heads again

The Christmas tale as told by St Luke begins with a census. It was the reason why Joseph and Mary were returning to their place of birth.

The idea is the same. The 27 April 1983 census in the Federal Republic of Germany will merely be more sophisticated.

Nowadays all levels of administration seem to have statistical units and departments of their own that ceaselessly compile and publish data.

Yet there remains an astonishing degree of uncertainty about true figures. Franz Kroppenstedt, head of the Federal Statistics Office in Wiesbaden, has grave doubts about the country's population.

It is estimated to be 61.5 million, but he feels the actual number is a million out, a substantial margin of error.

He and nearly all statisticians feel a new census is urgently needed. Ernst Albrecht, Prime Minister of Lower Saxony, is virtually alone in feeling that in the computer age a census is no longer as important as it used to be.

Even computers can only make projections based on past figures, which is all the current population estimate is, and they can often be proved to have been woefully inaccurate.

The last census, in 1970, showed there to have been 860,000 fewer people living in the country than had been assumed for the previous nine years.

The reasons for such wastage are often quite straightforward and cannot be ruled out by computerisation. Many people forget to notify the authorities when they move home or to register a death.

So the census, for which a date has finally been set after long arguments over who is to foot the bill, is long overdue.

It is overdue by international standards. According to the Wiesbaden statisticians the Federal Republic of Germany is the only leading industrialised country not to have held a census since 1970.

It is universally agreed that they must be held once every 10 years, otherwise statistics become too inaccurate. The desire for accuracy is not just a weakness of bureaucrats.

About 100 laws are based on population statistics. If the figures are wrong, the law is in serious jeopardy and runs a grave risk of being unfairly administered.

The exact population of local government areas has to be decided because it decides the scale on the basis of which funds are allocated, including the tax share-out between the Federal and state governments.

The number and size of Bundestag and state assembly constituencies also depends on the number of people who live in a given area.

The census also compiles details of sex, age, marital status, nationality and so on, all of which are important for comparison.

These figures are needed to estimate population trends such as how many old-age pensioners there will be at a given date, or how many children will start school or school-leavers go on to serve apprenticeships.

Forecasts of this kind are indispensable for planning pension schemes, education or labour administration. You can't run schools without some idea of prospective intake.

Politicians and civil servants associated with housing are keenly looking forward to the 1983 census findings. They should give a clearer idea of the number and size of households and the demand for new homes.

Current estimates of the number of households in the country vary by up to half a million. Planning mistakes in the housing sector can lead to wasted investment.

Next year's census itself will cost an estimated DM371m. Statisticians would not be worthy of the name if they had not worked out where the money was due to go.

Roughly half is expected to pay for extra staff to call round at people's homes with census forms or evaluate them afterwards.

So the census, if only for a limited period, will even create extra jobs.

Rudolf Grosskopff

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 9 March 1982)

Changing population structure by age

German Reich 1910 — 64.9 million; Federal Republic 1980 — 61.4 million; 2030 (estimate) — 51.6 million

Age: 95-100, 90-95, 85-90, 80-85, 75-80, 70-75, 65-70, 60-65, 55-60, 50-55, 45-50, 40-45, 35-40, 30-35, 25-30, 20-25, 15-20, 10-15, 5-10, 0-5

Men | Women

= a million people

Foreigners

Children with one parent

In 1981 there were 905,000 one-parent families in the Federal Republic of Germany, says the Federal Statistics Office in Wiesbaden.

In 244,000 cases death was the cause; in 545,000 cases, it was separation or divorce.

That leaves 116,000 single parents in Germany. They never married in the first place.

The number of fathers who run a family single-handedly has increased strikingly, nearly doubling in nine years from 88,000 in 1972 to 141,000 last year.

Most, 103,000, looked after only one child, but 28,000 cared for two and 10,000 for three or more.

But mothers who run families on their own are on the increase too. Between 1972 and 1981 their number increased from 618,000 to 764,000.

Again most, 497,000, had only one child. But 196,000 looked after two and 71,000 after three or more children.

ddp

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 2 March 1982)

Continued from page 14

occur mostly with older and already weakened people.

The exception that proves the rule: in the Mariana Islands in the Pacific flu killed 65 per cent of the population.

There had been no flu in the Marianas for several decades and the population had no immunity.

Professor Fazekas de St. Groth told the congress that there was every likelihood that in another five or ten years researchers will have come up with an effective flu prevention, though not a [illegible]

[illegible]

Wolf Rüskamp

[illegible]

Gipsies keep up struggle to win more war compensation

The gipsy's life is full of fun, a German folk-song says. Romanies themselves say it isn't and that they are still looked on as social outcasts.

The German Romany Association reckons only one in 10 has completed school. Not one of their number is a university graduate, says Romani Rose of Heidelberg, the association's president.

Many have neither social security nor health insurance. The only insurance old folk have is their children.

They live in slums and ghettoes on the outskirts of town and manage to survive doing odd jobs of one kind or another and they still suffer from discrimination.

There are 20,000 to 30,000 members of a Romany people who have lived in Germany for centuries and 60,000 Romanies who hail from Eastern Europe.

The conditions in which they live are so bad that in recent years they have begun to emerge as a protest movement.

Well over half a million gipsies were killed by the Nazis. Many survived the holocaust only as physical and mental wrecks.

The association says compensation has been inadequate. It is determined to do something about it. [illegible] Romanies are particularly critical of the attitude of authorities who refuse to acknowledge that gipsies were persecuted on racial grounds in the Third Reich.

The official argument in such cases is that until 1943 Romanies were sent to concentration camp solely as potential lawbreakers.

At the end of the war, Herr Rose says, Romanies were liberated more by coincidence than by design. No-one campaigned on their behalf in the way that others campaigned for their Jewish fellow-sufferers.

The Romanies would in any case have had difficulty in stating their case in writing. They are Indo-Aryans and speak a language akin to Sanskrit, but unlike Hebrew, the language of the Jews, it is not a written language.

Herr Rose says xenophobia is on the increase in Germany. Romanies are systematically made out to be criminals: loitering with intent and living as tramps and vagabonds.

In reality they would prefer a roof over their heads and a regular job, just like anyone else, especially as their traditional jobs are no longer in demand.

For centuries German gipsies have worked as tinkers, violin-makers and horse-traders. There is no longer a market for their services.

But they have gained in self-confidence as they challenge longstanding prejudice. Their German association was set up in Heidelberg about 30 years ago and represents them on international Romany bodies.

The International Romany Union consists of 22 organisations from as many countries, and new groupings have been set up all over Germany in recent years. There are now a dozen in the Federal Republic.

dpa

(Bremer Nachrichten, 26 February 1982)

A small town in Germany: the top contenders

The smallest locality in the Federal Republic of Germany has a population of six. It is the hamlet of Keppeshausen in the Rhineland-Palatinate.

Next comes [illegible], also in the Palatinate, with a population of eight. All are women.

Gröde is an islet off the North Sea coast of Schleswig-Holstein. Eleven people live there. It is well known for its early election returns on general election nights.

Then comes Wiedenborstel, also in Schleswig-Holstein, with a population of [illegible]

[illegible] have just been published by the Federal Statistics Office, [illegible] population [illegible]000).

[illegible] 7 March 1982)